










Dramatic  variations  across  provinces  in  per  capita  fiscal  capacity  have  created 
serious problems  for Canadian  federalism. The Equalization program addresses 
this  challenge  but  in  recent  years  ad  hoc  accommodations  resulting  from  a 
desire  to  satisfy  Newfoundland’s  demands  have  threatened  the  integrity  and 




Relative  to  most  countries  of  the  world,  Canadian  political  problems  are  trivial.  There  are 
however  two  deep  cracks  in  the  country’s  foundation  that  require  ongoing  attention  if  the 
political  edifice  of  a  federal  state  is  to  remain  intact.  The  first  is  the  linguistic/cultural  divide 
between  English‐speaking  Canadians  and  francophone  Quebecers;  the  second  is  the  large, 





Allophone  immigrants  reached  Montreal  in  large  numbers.  The  combination  imperiled  the 
survival of French as Quebec’s lingua franca. Camille Laurin performed a great – if unintended – 
service  for  Canadian  unity  by  enacting  Bill  101.  It  embodies  a  workable  compromise  on  a 
contentious subject, namely protecting the status of French as the dominant public language in 
Quebec  while  affording  reasonable  minority  language  services  to  English  speakers.  Pierre 
Trudeau proposed an idealistic but naive alternative: that Canadians become so fluently French‐
English  bilingual  that  Quebecers  feel  no  need  to  protect  French  in  “their”  province.  He 
performed a great – again unintended – disservice to Canadian unity by demonizing Bill 101 and 
insisting (via sections 16‐23 of the Charter) that official language minorities enjoy broad rights to 
litigate  in  the domain of public  language policy. The elites among the Liberal Party of Canada, 
                                                             








the  Reform/Alliance/Conservatives  and  the  Supreme  Court  justices  all  made  decisions  in  the 
1980s and 1990s  that widened  this  crack.  The near‐victory of  the Parti québécois  in  the 1995 







expectations  of  autonomy  and  the  constraints  on Ottawa’s  ability  to manage  social  programs 
efficiently  in  a  country  of  continental  dimensions,  this  decentralization  of  tax  and  spending 
authority  has  always  made  sense.  It  posed  few  fiscal  problems  at  the  level  of  modest  19th 
century public expectations. But dramatic variations across provinces in per capita fiscal capacity 
created  serious  problems  in  the  20th  century  as  Canadians  came  to  expect  more  from 
government. The centre‐piece of policy to manage this second crack is Equalization. 
The Role of Equalization 
The  logic  underlying  calculation  of  a  province’s  Equalization  entitlement  is  straightforward.  It 
requires  an  estimation  of  provincial  fiscal  capacity  based  on  a  so‐called  representative  tax 
system.  This  in  turn  requires  the  definition  of  the  tax  bases  accessible  to  each  provincial 
government,  and  an  estimation  of  how much  each  province  could  raise  by  imposing  average 
provincial  tax  rates  on  accessible  tax  bases.  Equalization  provides  to  “have  not”  provinces  – 
those with per capita  fiscal  capacity below a  specified benchmark – a grant  sufficient  to bring 
them up to it. The “have” provinces – those with per capita fiscal capacity above the benchmark 
–  receive  no  grant.  Negotiation  of  the  representative  tax  system  and  the  Equalization 
benchmark has usually been thrashed out among Ottawa and the ten provinces once every five 





1. Reconciliation  of  equal  social  citizenship  rights  with  the  advantages  of  decentralized 
management: 
As  Canadian  citizens,  residents  of  each  province  expect  reasonably  similar  core  social 
services. Without Equalization, residents of have‐not provinces – Quebec aside – would 
almost certainly by now have prevailed on Ottawa to assume direct funding and perhaps 
direct  managerial  responsibility  for  provision  of  these  core  services.  There  are  good 
managerial reasons to prevent such centralization under Ottawa’s tutelage. Whether in 
the  private  or  public  sector,  large  organizations  with  many  employees  are  more 













desire to redistribute  income from richer to poorer  individuals, the above discussion  is 
largely irrelevant. There is little evidence to indicate that typical citizens in one region of 
Canada  differ  substantially  from  typical  citizens  in  other  regions with  respect  to  their 
willingness  to  use  the  tax/transfer  system  for  this  purpose.  Social  programs  to 
redistribute  income  among  individuals  could  just  as  well  cut  out  the  provinces 
altogether.  Not  surprisingly,  if  we  restrict  attention  to  the  relatively  simple  social 
programs that redistribute income across individuals – programs such as old age security 
and  redistributive  features  of  the  personal  income  tax  –  there  exist  administrative 
economies of scale, and Ottawa has in most cases taken the lead. 
2. Reconciliation  of  intergovernmental  income  redistribution  with  the  benefits  of  own‐





management  of  their  respective  social  programs,  and  also  over  their  tax  regimes. 
Arguably,  both  these  features  contribute  to  Canadian  social  programs which  compare 
well  on  an  international  basis,  and  both  are  necessary  if  provincial  politicians  are  to 
garner electoral support based on efficient decision‐making, rather than garner support 
based  on  lobbying  Ottawa  over  discretionary  transfers. While  increasing  the  revenue 
available to a have‐not province from its tax effort, Equalization does not – at least not 
intentionally  –  distort  provincial  political  priorities  by  providing  incentives  to  develop 
particular programs or exploit particular tax bases. 
Implicit  in  this  discussion  is  that  reliance  by  politicians  on  own‐source  tax  revenue  is 
important  in  preserving  a  responsible  political  culture  at  the  provincial  level.  Own‐
source taxation provides a powerful  incentive to politicians to assess the costs of their 
proposals as well as the benefits. And the expectation – that those who stand to benefit 
from additional  public  services must  agree  to  pay  the additional  taxes  required  –  is  a 
powerful incentive on citizens to engage in provincial political debates. The dynamic of 
assessing  benefits  against  costs  usually  operates more  transparently  at  the  provincial 
than  at  the  federal  level.  This  is  not  because  provincial  politicians  are  wiser  or more 
fiscally  prudent  than  their  federal  counterparts  but  because  the  per  capita  impact  on 











stable.  Relying  on  a  regional  tax  base,  provincial  revenues  at  constant  tax  rates  are 
inevitably subject to higher variance than those of Ottawa, whose taxing effort is spread 
across  all  sectors  of  the  Canadian  economy.  Hence,  taxes  paid  to  Ottawa  should  be 





Following  the  virtual  bankruptcy of  the Prairie provinces  in  the Great Depression,  the Rowell‐
Sirois Commission in 1940 recommended a federal grant to provinces with weak fiscal capacity. 







addition to  launching programs within  its own jurisdiction (such as  incorporation of a negative 
income  tax  into old  age  security), Ottawa employed  its  spending power  in  areas  of  provincial 
jurisdiction,  thereby  inducing  the  provinces  to  spend  on  programs  of  interest  to  the  federal 
government.  For  example,  Ottawa  launched  in  1966  a  conditional  transfer  (the  Canada 
Assistance Plan) to finance 50 percent of eligible provincial social assistance spending. By 1980, 
the value of these conditional transfers exceeded that of Equalization.2 
Equalization  evolved over  time  and had become  sufficiently  important  by  the  1982 patriation 
exercise  to  warrant  a  clause  in  the  Constitution  Act,  1982.  Ottawa  is  required  to  make 
Equalization  payments  such  that  “provincial  governments  have  sufficient  revenues  to  provide 
reasonably  comparable  levels  of  public  services  at  reasonably  comparable  levels  of  taxation” 
(s.36(2)). 
Starting  in  the mid‐1970s,  two  interrelated  conundrums  emerged:  how  to  generate  electoral 
support for social program redesign (flaws in design became increasingly serious as time passed) 
and how to reconcile public expectations of services with public willingness to pay the necessary 
taxes.  From the mid‐1970s  to  the mid‐1990s,  the Canadian public  sector  (federal + provincial) 
was in continuous deficit. These deficits inevitably created a rising public sector debt/GDP ratio. 








By  the  early  1990s,  the  cash  value  of  major  intergovernmental  transfers  had  grown  to 
approximately one‐quarter of  all  federal  program  spending. Whereas  Equalization  remained a 
well defined rules‐based program, conditional transfers were subject to high‐profile acrimonious 
federal‐provincial  bargaining  and  the  rules  governing  them  varied  from  year  to  year.  They 
contributed to a political culture, both in Ottawa and the provinces, of ambiguous responsibility 
for both program design and financial accountability. 
Ottawa  blamed  the  provinces  for  distorting  the  intent  of  conditional  transfers  and worsening 
the  federal  deficit.  For  example,  in  the  late  1980s,  Ottawa  accused  Ontario,  a  prosperous 
province,  of  financing  an  overly  generous  social  assistance  regime  with  “50¢  dollars”  made 
feasible  by  the  shared‐cost  design  of  the  Canada Assistance  Plan  (CAP). Ottawa  subsequently 
capped the rate of growth of CAP transfers to Ontario and the two other “have” provinces.  In 
turn,  the  provinces  blamed  Ottawa  for  their  worsening  provincial  deficits  when  the  federal 
government unilaterally redefined conditional transfers, for example the “capping of CAP.” 
Canadian  politicians  ultimately  de‐escalated  this  tit‐for‐tat  bickering.  The  first  senior 
government to act was Saskatchewan, in 1992. At the time it was the most indebted province. 
Next  to  act  was  Alberta,  in  1993.  Both  governments  simultaneously  cut  spending  and  raised 
taxes,  bringing  their  respective  accounts  into  balance  by  1995.  In  explaining  the  decisions 
leading to Finance Minister Paul Martin’s epic 1995 budget, it is probable that the success of the 
Reform Party  in  the  1993  federal  election was  a  factor.  This  conservative  populist movement 
came  within  a  few  seats  of  becoming  the  Official  Opposition.  (Narrowly,  the  Bloc  québécois 
bested  it.)  In  one  of  the  most  dramatic  fiscal  turnarounds  in  OECD  history,  Ottawa  and  the 













has  allowed  Ottawa  both  to  increase  spending  on  core  programs  and  to  realize  sizeable 
budgetary surpluses. Federal politicians have used their fiscal room to launch new programs and 
to  undertake  strategic  reductions  in  tax  rates. Not  so  in  the  case  of many  provinces.  In most 
years of the last decade, the provincial public sector has  in aggregate remained in surplus, but 
the public pressure to  increase spending on core programs, health care  in particular, has been 
intense  and  many  provinces  have  incurred  intermittent  deficits.  Quebec  governments  have 
summarized  this  state  of  affairs  as  a  “vertical  fiscal  imbalance”  between  Ottawa  and  the 
provinces in terms of fiscal capacity and program expenditure expectations (Quebec 2002). 
Not  surprisingly,  the provinces have  lobbied Ottawa  to provide more  fiscal  room.  In principle, 
Ottawa could oblige in several ways: 1) tax transfer (i.e., lower federal rates and raise provincial 





have  reminded Canadians of  this agreement by calculating  the current value of  the  tax points 
transferred  in  1975.  While  Ottawa  did  indeed  lower  its  income  tax  rates  at  the  time,  the 
implication of these calculations is that Ottawa owned the tax room yielded and deserves credit 
in perpetuity for the tax revenue thereby foregone. After three decades in which both orders of 





Since Ottawa gets only  short‐term political  credit  for creating  tax  room to be  taken up by  the 
provinces, and since  it  loses all control over the use made of  its  foregone tax revenue, federal 
politicians  are  unlikely  to  repeat  the  1975  exercise.  Ever  since  the  1960s,  the  second means, 
reliance on conditional transfers, has appealed to federal politicians. Ottawa can thereby claim 
to be engaged in providing popular programs such as medicare and post‐secondary education to 
all  Canadians.  Furthermore,  via  the  conditions  attached  to  transfers,  Ottawa  can  induce  the 
provinces to spend in ways that Ottawa desires. 
Historically,  shared‐cost  conditional  transfers  served  a  useful  purpose  in  encouraging 









muddle  over  responsibility  for  program  design  and  financial  accountability  that  characterized 
intergovernmental  relations  prior  to  1995.  There  is  no  need  for  Ottawa  to  dispense  with 
conditional transfers, but there is a manifest need for some rules covering their use. 
Ottawa’s power to spend  is also a power not  to spend.5 Ottawa’s unilateral cut to shared‐cost 
conditional  transfers  in  1995 prompted  the  provinces  to  attempt  to  introduce  rules,  via what 
came to be known as the Social Union Framework Agreement (SUFA), to constrain their future 
use  by  the  federal  government.    The  essence  of  the  provincial  proposal  was  that  Ottawa  be 






With  the  federal  budget  balanced,  Ottawa  returned  to  a  pre‐1995  pattern  of  increasing  conditional 
transfers.  In  aggregate,  spending  on  such  transfers  has more  than  doubled  since  the  beginning  of  this 
decade, and for fiscal 2007‐08 is projected to be in excess of $30 billion. (See Figure 2.) To some extent, 








Our  Government  believes  that  the  constitutional  jurisdiction  of  each  order  of 
government  should  be  respected.  To  this  end  …  our  Government  will  introduce 
legislation  to  place  formal  limits  on  the  use  of  the  federal  spending  power  for  new 
shared‐cost  programs  in  areas  of  exclusive  provincial  jurisdiction.  This  legislation  will 
allow provinces  and  territories  to  opt  out with  reasonable  compensation  if  they  offer 
compatible programs (Canada 2007b). 
An  important  example  of  the  muddle  created  by  the  unilateral  federal  use  of  conditional 
transfers  in areas of provincial  jurisdiction  is  childcare programming. The 2005  federal budget 
introduced  a  new  $1  billion  five‐year  annual  transfer,  to  induce  the  provinces  to  introduce 
universal childcare programs modeled on that in Quebec (Canada 2005, chap. 4). On a national 
basis,  the  cost  of  Quebec‐style  childcare  would  be  at  least  $10  billion  annually.  Did  Ottawa 















Until  recently,  prospects  for  the  reform  and  enrichment  of  Equalization,  the  third  means  of 
addressing  the  “vertical  fiscal  imbalance,”  appeared  bleak.  As  mentioned  above,  the  rules 
governing  the  Equalization  program have  historically  been  thrashed  out  between Ottawa  and 
the  provinces  once  every  five  years.  Between  these marathon  debates,  calculation  of  annual 
Equalization  entitlements  is  intended  to  be  rules‐based  and  free  from  intergovernmental 
bargaining. However,  in the closely fought 2004 election campaign, Premier Danny Williams of 
Newfoundland and Labradour sought a special arrangement to prevent the normal functioning 
of  Equalization  based  on  a  representative  tax  system.  Prime Minister Martin  capitulated  and 
agreed  to  the  Atlantic  Offshore  Accords.  This  agreement  protects  Equalization  payments  to 
Newfoundland  and  Nova  Scotia,  potentially  until  2020,  from  any  reductions  that  the 
Equalization  formula  would  otherwise  require,  given  these  provinces’  increased  resource 
revenues. 
The Accords  are  a  serious  violation of  the  logic  of  Equalization  as  a  rules‐based  transfer,  free 
from political  bargaining.  Adding  to  the  damage, Ottawa  formally  introduced  a  so‐called New 







(Canada  2005,  chap.  3).  In  addition  to  incorporating  the  Atlantic  Offshore  Accords,  the  New 
Framework can be summarized as follows: 
 On an  interim basis, payments  to  receiving provinces were based on historical  shares. 
Hence, they did not bring the fiscal capacity of Equalization‐receiving have‐not provinces 
to a uniform benchmark. 
 The  New  Framework  proposed  a  predetermined  size  of  aggregate  Equalization 
payments, starting at $10 billion in 2004‐05, to be escalated annually at 3.5 percent over 
a  horizon  of  10  years.  This  destroyed  the  ability  of  the  program  to  serve  as 
interprovincial  insurance.  Aggregate  payments  would  no  longer  rise  to  compensate 
adverse shocks to provincial fiscal capacity or fall in the face of convergence in provincial 
fiscal capacity. 
 The  New  Framework  maintained  the  status  quo  of  33  separate  tax  bases.  The 
conceptual soundness of the estimates for many of these bases was questionable. 
Distressed  at  the  prospect  of  Equalization  unraveling with multiple  ad  hoc  arrangements,  the 
federal Finance Department commissioned Al O’Brien, ex‐Deputy Finance Minister of Alberta, to 
rethink  the  program.  The  tripling  of  oil  prices  since  the  beginning  of  the  decade  exacerbated 
regional  conflicts  over  the  design  of  Equalization. And  Steven  Harper,  while  Leader  of  the 
Opposition,  poured  oil  on  the  fire  (so  to  speak)  by  staking  out  the  position  that  provincial 
nonrenewable  resource  revenues  were  equivalent  to  income  derived  from  running  down  an 
asset. They were, he argued, sufficiently different from tax revenues that they should not enter 
into the calculation of provincial  fiscal capacity.7 To do that, retorted the “have not” premiers, 




he  recommended  50  percent  inclusion  in  the  calculation  of  provincial  fiscal  capacity  (“a  fine 
Canadian compromise” to quote the title of Boothe & Vaillancourt’s 2007 book on the topic). To 
their  credit,  Harper  and  his  Cabinet  colleagues  recanted  their  former  position,  and  accepted 
most  of  O’Brien’s  recommendations.  (See  the  Appendix  for  a more  detailed  summary  of  the 
Equalization reforms contained in the 2007 budget.) 
The Cabinet  resisted  the  “firewall” Albertans who wanted no  sharing of  resource wealth with 
“have nots” via Equalization; it resisted the demands, led by Newfoundland and Saskatchewan, 
on behalf of Martin’s  tradition of special arrangements;8  it  resisted British Columbia’s demand 










The  O’Brien  commission  undertook  an  exercise  to  estimate  the  impact  of  their 
recommendations  on  2007‐08  Equalization  entitlements,  in  aggregate  and  by  province.  The 























the  new  Equalization  formula  (and  ignoring  the  guaranteed  minima),  Newfoundland 
would  be  entitled  to  $521 million  in  Equalization  and  $212 million  in  offset  amounts 
while Nova Scotia would be entitled to $1,465 million in Equalization and $68 million in 






• The  introduction of  the  ten‐province average as  the benchmark  increases  total annual 
entitlements by nearly $2 billion. 
• The  O’Brien  recommendation  of  the  elimination  of  user  fees  as  separate  tax  base, 
lowers entitlements  in have‐not provinces that were, under the former rules, assumed 
to have below‐average fiscal capacity from this tax base. 
• The  introduction  of  a  market‐value  approach  to  property  tax  capacity  increases 














Table  2  illustrates  the  legislated  2006‐07  Equalization  entitlements  under  the  previous  New 
Framework  formula  and  the  higher  values  under  the  new  formula  introduced  with  the  2007 
budget. 
Obviously, the Cabinet undertook its 2007 reforms with tactical political considerations in mind. 
The  Conservatives  hope  to  increase  support  among  Francophone  Quebecers  in  the  next 
election. Hence, the priority on redesigning Equalization in a manner that can be interpreted in 
Quebec as a response to the provincial claim of vertical fiscal imbalance. For diplomatic reasons, 
the  Budget makes  no  reference  to  the  fact  that  the  imbalance  is more  acute  in Quebec  than 
most  provinces  because Quebec  governments  have  resisted many  of  the  dimensions  of  fiscal 
redress undertaken elsewhere. Thus, Quebec tuition fees in post‐secondary institutions are very 
low,  as  are  Quebec  Hydro  power  rates.  Quebec  funds  a  highly  subsidized  universal  childcare 
program whose  benefits  have  disproportionately  accrued  to  wealthier  families.  Over  the  last 




An  implicit  constraint on Equalization design  is  that Ontario be a “have” province. This means 
Ontario taxpayers help pay for Equalization, but receive nothing in return. To mollify misgivings 
in  Queen’s  Park  over  higher  Equalization  entitlements,  the  Cabinet  incorporated  O’Brien’s 
recommendation  of  a  fiscal  cap.  The  cap  is  an  inelegant  ad  hoc  exception  to  O’Brien’s 
fundamental recommendation for treatment of resource revenue. If the Cabinet fully subscribed 
to  the  recommendation  of  50  percent  inclusion  in  definition  of  provincial  fiscal  capacity,  the 
matter of a have‐not province potentially achieving per capita fiscal capacity above the  lowest 
non‐receiving province could not arise. The anomaly arises because the fiscal cap is defined after 
redefining  fiscal  capacity,  for  the  purpose  of  the  cap,  in  terms  of  100  percent  inclusion  of 
resource revenue. 
A final exercise in political finesse is construction of the 100 percent resource revenue exclusion 
option.  Given  the  fiscal  cap  and  given  that  most  have‐not  provinces  are  resource‐poor,  this 
option  is  currently  unattractive.  (See  Box  1  for  further  elaboration.)  Were  the  cap  to  be 
removed,  it  would  become  attractive  for  resource‐rich  have‐not  provinces.  Presumably,  this 










The  O’Brien  Report  and  the  2007  budget  have  done  good  work  in  undoing  the  damage  to 
Equalization wrought by the 2005 New Framework. There should be no illusions, however, that 
all  eleven  senior  governments  now  subscribe  to  the  importance  of  a  rules‐based  Equalization 
program for which political bargaining is restricted to major renegotiation once every five years. 
Clearly, there remain important tensions. Quebec considers higher Equalization entitlements as 






The next  logical  step  in  reform of  intergovernmental  relations  is  to make good on  the Throne 
























The  Budget  enabled  Newfoundland  and  Nova  Scotia  to  maintain  the  benefits  of  the  Atlantic 











When  in  Opposition,  the  Conservatives  had  argued  that  non‐renewable  resource  revenues 
comprise  income  derived  from  exhausting  provincially  owned  assets,  and  are  conceptually 
different from tax levies on ongoing economic activities. Hence, they should not be included in 




















The  provinces  that  could  potentially  benefit  from  the  exclusion  option  are Newfoundland, Nova  Scotia 
and  Saskatchewan.  Neither  Newfoundland  nor  Saskatchewan  can  profit  from  the  exclusion  option 
because their Equalization grants are constrained by another provision of O’Brien’s recommendation: the 
fiscal  capacity  cap.  It  prevents  the  equalized  fiscal  capacity  of  any  province  (fiscal  capacity  defined  to 
include 100 percent of resource revenues) from exceeding that of the poorest non‐Equalization receiving 
province  (in  2007,  British  Columbia).  In  the  short  run,  Nova  Scotia  fares  better  under  the  renewed 
Equalization system, but would have lost Offshore Accord benefits over the long run if it abandoned the 
New  Framework  system.  Subsequent  to  the  Budget,  Ottawa  backtracked  by  offering  a  guarantee  of 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5  When  Ottawa  cut  conditional  transfers  in  1995,  they  comprised  nearly  one  quarter  of  all  federal 
program spending. The provinces protested that Ottawa was “downloading” its deficit to them. True 
enough.  But  why  should  Ottawa  have  spared  the  provinces?  Ottawa’s  core  social  spending 
responsibilities  are  not  cost‐sharing  provincial  social  programs.  The  core  federal  social  spending 
responsibility  is  for  old  age  security,  on‐reserve  Aboriginal  programs,  and  labour‐market 
programming  such  as  unemployment  insurance.  Ottawa  essentially  froze  spending  on  these 
envelopes.  Equalization  is  a  rules‐based  program  governed  by  five‐year  agreements  with  the 
provinces.  It  too  was  spared.  Overall,  Ottawa  reduced  all  other  spending,  including  conditional 
transfers to the provinces, by a fifth. 
6  An  improvement  over  pre‐1995  policy  is  that  dollar‐for‐dollar  cost‐sharing  (so‐called  50¢  dollars)  and 
“back  door”  associated  equalization  have  been  eliminated.  While  their  aggregate  value  remains 
subject  to  intergovernmental  lobbying,  the  major  conditional  grants  are  now  distributed  across 
provinces in annual block grants determined essentially on the basis of provincial population. 
7 According to the 2006 election platform, a future Conservative government would “work to achieve … 
permanent  changes  to  the  equalization  formula  which  would  ensure  that  non‐renewable  natural 
resource  revenue  is  removed  from  the  equalization  formula  to  encourage  economic  growth.” 
(Conservative Party of Canada 2006, 43). 
8 See qualification in box. 
9 The British Columbia ministry of finance estimated that in 2007 a two‐parent two‐child family in Quebec 
with annual family income of $60,000 paid $9400 in provincial direct taxes. Such a family paid $8000 
in Ontario and $5900 in British Columbia (British Columbia 2007, Table A3). 
